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Using the NLSY data set, this paper formulates and then empirically estimates the 
production processes for social, motivational and cognitive skills during early childhood 
development and the long-term effects of these skills on learning and life-time earnings of an 
individual. Using these estimated relationships, the paper provides a calibrated intergenerational 
altruistic model of parental investment in children's preschool. This dynamic model is then used 
to estimate the effects of publicly provided preschool to the children of poor socioeconomic status 
(SES) on college mobility and intergenerational social mobility and to estimate the tax burden of 
such a social contract.  
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Many are highly skeptical about a positive answer to the basic question: ''Can we conquer poverty 
through school?''  There are many reasons for this skepticism. In the US, education up to high 
school level is virtually free. Yet many children of poor SES do not complete high school and 
many of them perform poorly in schools. This naturally beckons to the possibility that the poor 
quality of the public schools that the children of poor SES attend is the reason for such failings. 
Improving school quality will improve school performance of these children only marginally. 
Many empirical studies find that better school quality in terms of lower class size, higher public 
expenditures per pupil, improved curriculum, and higher desegregation have only marginal 
effects on school performance of the children of poor SES. See Hanushek [1986] for a survey of 
studies along this line.  
A growing consensus reached among educators, among media writers (see for instance, 
Taub [2002], among researchers in economics (see for instance, Heckman [1999] and Currie 
[2001]) and among researchers in sociology, psychology and education (see for in stance, Barnett 
[1995], Entwisle [1995], McCormick [1989], Schweinhart et al. [1993]) is that the children of 
poor SES are not prepared for college because they were not prepared for school to begin with.  
The most effective intervention for the children of poor SES should be directed at the preschool 
stage so that these children are prepared for school and college.  The question is then does 
preschool investment have long-term positive effects on school performance and labor market 
success?  This is the main issue I address in this paper.    4
Most of the studies along this line use data on Head Start preschool program which is 
funded by the Federal government.  The program is available only to children whose parents earn 
incomes below poverty line.  Not all eligible children are covered by the program, however.  The 
quality of the program is very poor compared to the pilot programs and most of the private 
preschool programs.  Some studies find that the Head Start Preschool Program has no long-term 
effect on children’s cognitive achievements and school performance especially for black children.  
Currie and Thomas [1995] carried out a careful econometric investigation and concluded that the 
benefits disappear for black children because most of the Head Start black children attend low 
quality public schools.  After controlling for the school quality, however, they found significant 
positive effects of Head Start Preschool Program.  See Barnett [1995] for a survey of other 
studies on the long-term educational effects of early childhood programs in the US. 
The above studies are not based on nationally representative samples of children, and 
most studies examine only the effect on school performance such as grade retention and high 
school and college graduation rates, and do not model parental choice of children’s preschool 
investment.  In this paper, I formulate a model of parental investment in preschool that is guided 
by economic incentives.  I empirically show that preschool investment benefits children to 
acquire socialization and motivational skills, especially for the children of poor SES who live in 
poor HOME environments, that the motivational skills significantly improve school performance, 
and that the socialization and motivational skills improve the life-time earnings of children.   
These significant positive effects are found after controlling for their education level, innate 
ability, and family background. I formulate an intergenerational altruistic model of parental 
preschool investment.  I use a mixed reduced form econometric estimation method and a 
calibration method to numerically specify the parameters of the model, and then use this model to 
examine the long-term intergenerational economic effects of publicly providing preschool to 
children of poor SES.    5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides the basic decision 
making framework, section 3 provides empirical estimates, and section 4 provides the economic 
benefits of social program of providing preschool to children of poor SES.  . 
 
2. The Basic Framework 
In this section I formulate a simple model of preschool investment decision of an altruistic parent. 
The preschool investment decision of a parent depends on several other decisions made at later 
stages by the parent and the child. In this section, I describe each of these decision stages. In a 
subsection later I discuss the estimation issues. I report the empirical estimates in the next section.  
For expositional ease I assume that each family has one parent and one child, and address them 
using male gender. 
I assume that an individual’s life comprises of several discrete periods during which 
important life-cycle events relevant to leaning and earning occur.  I aggregate the whole life-cycle 
into four periods as follows:  [0-4], [5-16], [17-25], [26–].  In each of these periods some 
educational and labor market decisions are made and outcomes are observed.  During age [0-5] a 
parent invests in his child’s preschool activities which develop the child’s school readiness, and 
cognitive, social and motivational skills.  Let h  be the level of parental preschool investment. I 
assume that h  is annualized over the working years of the parent
2. At the end of this period, the 
child acquires a level of innate ability or cognitive skill τ , social skill σ  and motivational skill 
µ .  The level of each type of skills that the child acquires depends on other factors as well.  For 
instance, it depends on child-rearing practices at home, the nature of neighborhood in which the 
child grows-up, and the level of schooling, cognitive, socialization and motivational skills of the 
                                                 
2 We are assuming that parents are not liquidity constrained for investing in their children’s preschool.  
This is a strong assumption given that parents are at their early years of working age when they have 
children and might not have built up enough assets to be able to borrow from the market at the market 
interest rate.    6
parent. In the next section I describe and empirically estimate the role of parental preschool 
investment in the production of these skills in details. 
During age [5-16], the child goes to school.  The school performance at this stage 
depends on the levels of τ ,σ andµ  that the child acquired during the previous stage, on the 
quality of the school that he attends, and also on the type of neighborhood kids whom the child 
mingles with.  It also depends on the parental home inputs such as how many hours the parent 
spend time with the child to do his homework, how many hours the child watches TV, and how 
stable and stimulating the relationships among the family members are.  Many of these are choice 
variables for the parent.  Since not much information about these is available in the data set, I 
assume that the levels of τ ,σ andµ  from the previous period remain constant at the end of 
second stage.   
During [17-25] the child makes his schooling decisions.  Two important ingredients to 
this decision are the costs and benefits of attaining a given level of schooling. There are many 
dimensions to the cost of schooling, but I will make many simplifying assumptions.  I assume 
that he does not work during this schooling period.  During [26-] he works, forms a family with a 
child and decides how much to invest in his preschool, elementary school and high school. At the 
beginning of the schooling period [17-25], the child decides how many years of college to have 
and what type of college to attend. An important determinant of this decision is the financial 
rewards or earnings in the labor market over the whole life time that an individual will command 
from various levels of schooling. Another non-financial benefit of higher schooling of an 
individual is that it provides better family background for his child from which his child benefits.  
The structure of schooling costs is generally very complicated.  The type of college that he likes 
to attend depends on how much college fund he can raise from the market and how much college 
money he can get from his parent. I assume that each individual borrows the whole college fund 
from the market. The interest rate r for borrowing the college fund may depend on his parent’s   7
wealth position and if there is government educational loans available at a low rate.  Let  (,) csr  
be the cost of s years of college annualized over the working years of the individual. There are 
many important life cycle events that also influence the schooling decision of an adult child. For 
instance, bad influence and financial responsibilities towards other family members because of 
bad health shocks, or loss of employment of the parent may cause a child choose less education. I 
represent these factors by an aggregative random variable  . s ε     
I take the rewards or benefits from schooling to be the yearly permanent income, which 
depends on his number of years of schooling s ,  his innate ability τ , his level of socialization 
skills, σ , his level of  motivational skills, µ , and also on his life-cycle experience of random 
shock  p ε  such as market luck, family connection and network. Let the yearly permanent income 
of the child over the working years
3 be denoted as  () ;, ,,p ws τσµ ε . His financial rewards net of 
schooling cost is then given by () ˆ ;, ,,p ws τσµ ε  =  () ;, ,, (,) p ws csr τσµε − .   
Let the state variables of our system be denoted by the vector  () ,,,, , s p zs τσµ εε = .  
For any variable  , x  I adopt the convention of using  x  if it refers to parent and  ' x  if it refers to 
his child.  Denote the optimal schooling level of the child by  ()
* ,,,, s sh τσµ ε .  The parent takes 
this optimal schooling decision of his child as given
4 and decides the level of optimal preschool 
investment level by solving the following Bellman equation of the associated dynamic 
programming problem:  
 
                                                 
3 Since the traditionally earnings function does not incorporate skills such asσ andµ  which can be  
produced by spending resources, we refer to our yearly permanent income incorporating σ and µ  as an 
augmented Mincer earnings function.   
4 I take this optimal schooling decisions as given and estimate this optimal reaction function using  the 
NLSY data set.  The determination of this optimal solution is not specified in this paper.  It can be 
determined as solution to a subgame perfect equilibrium (see Raut [2000]) on this).    8
(1)  () () () () () ( ) 0 max ' , ' h hw z Vz uwz h VzQ z d z γ ≤≤ =− + ∫  , 
 
where V(.) is the value function, u(.) is the felicity index of yearly permanent consumption 
() , p wz h ε −    of the parent, γ  measures the degree of parental altruism towards the child, and 
(, ' ) h Qz z is the transition probability of the child moving to state  ' z  given the state variable of 
the parent z .  This transition probability depends on the production processes for talent, 
socialization, motivational skills and how the random shocks are generated. In the next section,   I 
explain the specifications and estimation of these relationships.  Assuming that 01 γ ≤<   but 
close to 1, and that the optimal schooling decision,   ()
*' '' , ' , ' , , s ss h τσµε =  is a well-behaved 
function, there exists a value function  () Vz, and optimal decision rule  ()
* hz  under quite 
general conditions on the primitives,  (.) u ,  () ,' h Qz z,  γ  and  () wz   (see Stokey and Lucas 
[1989] for instance).  
The NLSY dataset does not have data on the amount spent on preschool.  It has data only 
on a binary variable of whether the respondent had preschool or not.  Given this data limitation, I 
treat parental preschool investment decision variable as a binary variable. Another serious 
limitation of the NLSY dataset is that it does not have data on all the state variables of the parents 
of the respondents, e.g., on  , τσ and µ .  While it has information on  , τσ and µ  for the 
respondents, it does not have information on the preschool of their own children.  Thus I cannot 
follow the synthetic cohort approach of using respondents’ data to estimate the counterfactual 
optimal preschool decision rule 
* h  of their parents. Given these data limitations, I do not follow 
the strategy of imposing strong restrictions on the functional forms to identify and estimate the 
structural model. Instead, I follow a mixed calibration and reduced form estimation procedure as   9
follows:  I drop  p ε  in our model, i.e., I assume that the permanent yearly income is independent 
of  p ε , and thus it does not enter the optimal preschool choice rule. I estimate () ,' h Qz z,  () wz  , 
()
*' ', ', ', , s sh τσµε  directly using the NLSY data and specify numerically the felicity index  (.) u  
and the parental altruism parameter γ .  I then solve the fully specified dynamic programming 
problem numerically.  I use these estimates and the optimal solution to examine the economic 
effects of providing preschool resources to children of poor SES.  
 
3.  Empirical  Findings 
3.1 The  NLSY79  Dataset 
  A lot has been written about the NLSY79 data set, so I will not describe 
the data set in details.   The NLSY79 dataset contains life-cycle information on a 
nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 years 
old when they were first surveyed in 1979.  From 1979 to 1994, these individuals were 
surveyed annually. Currently they are interviewed on a biennial basis. Since their first 
interview 1979, many of the respondents have made transitions from school to work, and 
formed their own family instead of living with their parents. This dataset provides a large 
sample of American men and women that were born in the 1950s and 1960s and living in 
the United States in 1979. 
This dataset contains richer information on school and labor market experiences 
of a nationally representative sample of individuals. This dataset, however, contains 
limited information on early childhood inputs of the sampled individuals.  Although there 
is a recent dataset that collects panel data on the children of the NLSY respondents, we   10
have to wait several years to obtain data on labor market outcomes of these children.  
From all these considerations, the NLSY dataset stands out as the best choice for our 
analysis.   
3.2   Production of social and motivational skills 
In this section I consider the production process of the socialization and motivational skills. In the 
next two subsections I empirically show that motivational and socialization skills are important 
determinants of earning and learning.  
The literature in sociology, psychology, early childhood development and physiology 
suggest that early childhood investment is the most crucial input for development of cognitive, 
social and motivational skills. The studies in these literatures link school success to home 
environment, child rearing practices, neighborhood type in which the kid is raised.  For instance, 
the Coleman report [1966] and subsequent studies find that the family capital, which captures 
family tradition and values towards economic success and education, and the social capital, which 
captures the benefits of social bonds, social norms, social networks, the social bonds between 
adults and children and among children in a neighborhood are of immense value during a child’s 
growing up. These factors affect parental choices of preschool investment and child rearing 
methods which in turn determine a child's cognitive abilities and social abilities such as 
motivation and sociability that affect their learning and earning.  Physiology literature produces 
ample evidence that the human brain develops extremely rapidly during age [2-4], and the type of 
stimulations regarding health and learning that the child experiences during this period is a 
critical determinant of a child’s cognitive, social and motor developments.  Child psychology 
literature also points out that a structured preschool stimulation boosts a child’s self-confidence, 
school preparedness, parents’ and teachers’ assessment of the child’s ability. These in turn create   11
a conducive learning environment for the child over many more years of schooling beginning 
with the elementary school. See  Entwisle [1995], and Barnett [1995] for more on these issues.  
I construct the variables of this study as follows: 
 
Early childhood inputs and home environment: I take father’s and mother’s education levels to 
measure family background.  The NLSY dataset has poor measures of respondent’s early 
childhood inputs.  It has only a binary variable containing information on whether the respondent 
had preschool (does not include Head Start) experience or not.  I treated individuals with Head 
Start experience as no preschool. Notice that this will lead to underestimation of the effect of 
preschool investment.  I use the revised AFQT score to measure innate ability. 
 
Socialization skill (σ):  Each respondent were asked how social he/she felt towards others at age 
6.  This was expressed in the scale of 1 to 4.  The highest number represented most social.  I 
create a binary sociability variable by assigning value 1 if a respondent reported an answer 3 or 4 
to this question and assigning 0 otherwise.  
 
Motivational skill (µ):  I use three measures of motivation. (i) Job aspiration (µ1) which I 
construct as a binary variable taking value 1 if during the first interview in 1979 the respondent 
aspired for professional jobs, otherwise taking value 0. (ii) The educational goal (µ2) is the grade 
that the respondent in 1979 expected to achieve.  (iii) The Rotter’s scale of self control and self-
confidence (µ3) which I reconstructed from the scores of original four questions in the data set.  
My measure takes values 0 to 4, a higher value representing more confident and self-control. 
  I estimated a Probit model for σ and µ1 and OLS models for µ2 and µ3. The parameter 
estimates are reported in table 1.   12
Table 1:  Determinants of Sociability and Motivations 
Variables     Sociability  Job Aspiration  Education Goal  Self-Control 
(Rotter) 
      (σ)  (µ1) ( µ2) ( µ3) 
Intercept     -0.6467 -0.6102  11.8089  1.9911 
      (8.11)  (7.24)  (98.13)  (31.903) 
Revised AFQT 
Score  0.0013 0.0131  0.0311 0.0094 
      (1.91)  (17.80)  (31.30)  (18.16) 
Mother's grade     0.0115  -0.0064  0.0471  0.0100 
      (1.63)  (0.86)  (4.45)  (1.82) 
Father's Grade     0.0199  0.0207  0.0421  0.0083 
      (3.43)  (3.35)  (4.82)  (1.84) 
Preschool     0.0884  0.1553  0.6100  0.0399 
      (2.12)  (3.33)  (9.58)  (1.21) 
Gender     -0.0462  0.2884  0.1484 -0.0322 
      (1.41)  (8.17)  (2.99)  (1.25) 




   -4010.09  -3389.02 0.2541 0.0861 
Note:  First two columns show parameter estimates from Probit model, and the last two columns 
show parameter estimates of ordinary least squares estimates.  The absolute t-value of an 
parameter estimate is shown in parentheses below the parameter estimate.   
 
 
  From table 1 it is clear that after controlling for parents’ grades, preschool experience has  
a significantly positive effect on socialization skill and on all measures of motivational skills 
except the Rotter’s scale of self control.  The estimates in the table also show that innate ability 
has strong positive effect on all measures of motivational skills but has no significant effect on 
socialization skills.  Socialization skills are created in the family using the preschool and 
neighborhood inputs. 
It will be interesting to see if preschool has stronger positive effect on socialization and 
motivational skills of children of poorer SES.  If so, then the preschool could be used to 
compensate for the better HOME environment that the well-to-do counterpart of these children 
have. That is, through intervention like preschool, we can achieve a higher equality of   13
opportunities by equalizing the differences in the starting social, motivational, and cognitive skills 
of the children.  
 
3.3 An Augmented Earnings Function - Role of socialization and 
motivational skills  
 
In this section I examine the effect of social and motivational skills together with the 
effect of innate ability and grades on earnings.  The previous studies, however, included only 
innate ability, schooling level and school quality as the main determinants of earnings.  While 
preschool investment is an important determinant of these skills, I also included preschool binary 
variable as one of the regressors in the earnings function to see if it has an independent effect.  In 
my specification, I also included a dummy variable for College (taking value 1 if a respondent 
graduated from college).  This dummy variable after controlling for the grade variable captures 
any earnings premiums that a worker earners by graduating from college.  Since I included AFQT 
score which is a reasonably good measure of one’s innate ability, the parameter estimates do not 
have the ability bias problem.   
The column 1 of Table 1 shows the parameter estimates of this augmented earnings 
function.  It is clear from the estimates that after controlling for innate ability, family background 
and the schooling level, the measures of socialization and motivational skills have significant 
positive effects on earnings.  Preschool has no independent positive effect on earnings.    It is also 
interesting to note that completing college provides a positive premium on yearly earnings.    14
Table 2:  Estimated Parameters of the Augmented Mincer Earnings Function and 
the Optimal Schooling Function  
Variables  Log of Yearly Wages  Completed Grade Level 
Intercept  0.4456 3.7194 
   (3.32) (21.64) 
Revised AFQT Scores  0.0047 0.0312 
   (22.09) (30.00) 
Grade  0.0407    
   (14.61)    
Dummy Variable for College  0.0688    
   (4.94)    
Age  0.5284    
   (52.54)    
Square of Age  -0.0079    
   (41.80)    
Mother's Grade  0.0095 0.0620 
   (5.18) (6.61) 
Father's Grade  0.0058 0.0318 
   (3.94) (4.25) 
Dummy Variable for Preschool  0.0117 0.2551 
   (1.10) (4.69) 
Sociobility (σ)  0.0157 0.0718 
   (1.89) (1.66) 
Motivation- Job Aspiration (µ1)  0.0425 0.1697 
   (4.55) (3.46) 
Motivation- Education Goal (µ2)  0.0108  0.4440 
   (4.32) (38.00) 
Motivation -Rotter Scale (µ3)  0.0335 0.0673 
   (8.31) (3.21) 
Dummy Variable for Female Gender  -0.5036 0.1595 
   (61.97) (3.78) 
Dummy Variable for Race Hispanic  0.0481 0.1698 
   (3.83) (2.60) 
Dummay Variable for Race Black  -0.2056 0.3147 
   (17.15) (5.15) 
R
2   0.32  0.56 
Number of observations  60,490  5,926 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses 
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3.4   Estimation of optimal schooling level 
I consider two specifications of the optimal schooling function  ()
*' ', ', ', , s sh τσµε  in 
this paper. In the first specification, I assume that the schooling level is a continuous variable and 
specify the optimal reaction function  ()
*' ', ', ', , s sh τσµε  as a linear function.  I assume that the 
random variable 
'
s ε  constitutes the error term and satisfies all the assumptions of the OLS 
model
5.   The parameter estimates from this model are shown in the second column of table 1. I 
included the socialization and motivational skills together with innate ability and family 
background measured by parents’ education levels.  
It is clear from the estimates that the main determinant of grade is the innate ability 
measured by AFQT score.  After controlling for family background, I also find that motivation 
measures have significant positive effect on schooling level.  Out of the three measures of 
motivation, the measure  2 µ  based on the expected grade that the respondent desired to attain 
while very young turns out to be the most important one.  The sociability skill has, however, no 
effect on the schooling level.   After controlling for all other variables, preschool has still an 
independent positive effect on the completed grade.  This may be because the preschool creates 
other skills that are important for school success but are not captured in the included determinants 
in our specification of optimal schooling function.  
Notice that even after controlling for innate ability, the family backgrounds measured by 
mother’s grade and father’s grade have significant positive effects on the completed grade.  Given 
everything else same, a Black or a Hispanic child attains a higher grade than a White child.  The 
observed low grade achievements of the Black and Hispanic children are then due to their poor 
family background.  
                                                 
5 More generally we could assume that  ()
' |' ,' ,' , 0 s Eh ετσµ = , and use GLS method to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.     16
In the second specification, I consider two levels of schooling:  college or higher ( 1 s = ), 
and no college ( 0 s = ).  This simplified specification is for the purpose of calibrating the 
dynamic programming problem in (1). Again I assume that  ()
*' ', ', ', , s sh τσµε  is linear, and that 
'
s ε  constitutes the error term and it is normally distributed.  This gives us a Probit model of 
college enrollment. The parameter estimates are reported in table 3. Here again the innate ability, 
motivation, preschool and the college status of parents (which takes 1 if at least one parent had 
some college, and 0 otherwise) turn out to have significant positive effects on the probability of 
college enrollment.  
 
3.5  Optimal Parental Preschool Investment 
To numerically solve the dynamic programming problem in (1), one has a few choices.  
One could assume the state variables s , τ , and ε  to be continuous and the rest to be binary, and 
then use the parametric path method of Judd [1999] or a suitable value-iterations or policy 
iterations methods developed in the numerical dynamic programming literature, see Rust [1995] 
for a survey of these methods. Because we have many state variables, our problem is subject to 
the well-known “curse of dimensionality” problem of numerical dynamic programming methods.  
I impose the following restrictions to keep the numerical computation manageable.  
I assume that the state variables  ,, , s τσµ  are binary, the random variable  s ε  is 
continuous which is observed by the decision maker but not by the econometrician, the random 
variable  p ε  is absent, and the preschool investment decision h  is a binary variable, taking value 
1 when parents decide to invest in preschool and 0 otherwise. For most children, we have two 
parents but in the model I have assumed one parent.  I have used both parents’ information in 
computation as follows: I construct parent’s binary schooling variable s by assigning s = 1 if the 
average grades of two parents is more than 12, otherwise s = 0. I assume that τ  is biologically   17
inherited and it is not influenced by preschool investment. I create the binary variable τ  
assigning it the value 1 (interpreted as an individual is highly talented) if the AFQT score of the 
individual is 70 or higher, and assigning it the value 0 otherwise.  I do not have information on 
AFQT of parents.  The literature on intelligence recommends that the correlation between 
parent’s IQ and the child’s IQ is anywhere between 0.3 and 0.7.  I assume it to be 0.3 in our 
numerical exercise. To measure motivation, I use the binary job aspiration variable 1 µ . The 
specifications and the estimates of the Probit models of 
* s , σ  and µ  are shown in table 3.  I use 
these estimates to calculate the transition matrix h Q .  
Schweinhart et al. took average yearly preschool cost to be $6178 per year.  Consistent 
with their study, I take the preschool cost per child to be $18000 for three years and annualize it 
over the working years of an individual.  I further assume that the felicity index is linear and 
measured in dollars. I numerically specify the parental altruism parameter to be  0.65 γ = .    
After calibrating the model as above, I use the linear programming approach to solve (1) 
numerically. The optimal preschool investment decision and the value function are shown 
respectively in column 3 and 4 of table 4. 
Notice from table 4 that parents with income below a cut-off point do not invest in their 
children’s preschool.  I refer to these parents as parents of poor SES.     18
 
Table 3: Estimated forms of earnings function and Probit models of college completion, 
socialization and motivation 
Variables     w(s,τ,σ,µ)  Probability of  Probability of   Probability of 
         College  being sociable  being motivated 
Intercept 
   8330.0784 -1.4313  0.4763  -0.3034 
      (15.62) (48.85)  (28.32)  (18.17) 
Schooling ( = 1     6653.9343          
If College, 0 otherwise     (7.50)          
Innate ability (τ)     6109.6419  1.3779       
      (7.04)  (33.84)       
Sociability (σ)     1293.8865          
      (1.94)          
Motivation:      2731.5873  0.1344       
Job aspiration (µ1)     (4.10)  (3.54)       
Preschool ( h = 1)     2126.5631 0.3431  0.1457  0.0728 
H=0 no preschool     (2.55) (7.51)  (3.63)  (1.89) 
Parent's schooling ( = 1        0.9480  0.2005  0.2925 
If college, 0 otherwise)        (13.34)  (2.99)  (4.78) 
Average value of the                
Dependent variable        0.2069  0.6964  0.3933 
 
Table 4: Solutions of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium  
            invariant distribution    
State 
(s,τ,β,µ)  w(s,τ,β,µ)  opt.h*  V*(s) (without)  p* (without)  p* (with) 
V*'(s) 
(with) 
(0, 0, 0, 0)  8718.235854  0  32951.71  0.0614  0.0409  33471.62 
(0, 0, 1, 0)  10122.63317  0  34356.11  0.1370  0.1147  34876.02 
(0, 0, 0, 1)  10144.64353  0  34378.12  0.1310  0.1094  34898.03 
(0, 0, 1, 1)  11549.04085  0  35782.52  0.3200  0.3289  36302.43 
(0, 1, 0, 0)  14975.44989  1  41575.34  0.0082  0.0049  41575.34 
(1, 0, 0, 0)  15463.36815  1  41740.68  0.0028  0.0036  41740.68 
(0, 1, 1, 0)  16379.8472  1  42979.74  0.0189  0.0139  42979.74 
(0, 1, 0, 1)  16401.85757  1  43001.75  0.0123  0.0086  43001.75 
(1, 0, 1, 0)  16867.76546  1  43145.07  0.0073  0.0108  43145.07 
(1, 0, 0, 1)  16889.77583  1  43167.08  0.0338  0.0438  43167.08 
(0, 1, 1, 1)  17806.25488  1  44406.14  0.0303  0.0256  44406.14 
(1, 0, 1, 1)  18294.17314  1  44571.48  0.1066  0.1480  44571.48 
(1, 1, 0, 0)  21720.58218  1  50395.88  0.0046  0.0043  50395.88 
(1, 1, 1, 0)  23124.9795  1  51800.28  0.0118  0.0128  51800.28 
(1, 1, 0, 1)  23146.98986  1  51822.29  0.0279  0.0298  51822.29 
(1, 1, 1, 1)  24551.38718  1  53226.69  0.0859  0.1001  53226.69   19
4. Economic benefits from public provision of preschool 
I have shown that investment in preschool enhances certain skills that are important for 
learning and earning.  The optimal solution revealed that the parents of poor SES do not invest in 
their children’s preschool.  If preschool is publicly provided for the children of poor SES, it will 
have many economic benefits: It will increase social mobility, it will reduce income inequality, it 
will improve college enrollment rate, it will improve the community or criminal behavior, and it 
will also bring higher tax revenues because more workers will be earning higher wages.  It is 
important to note that the magnitude of the effects of publicly provided preschool depends on 
whether the social protection is available to all future generations or it is just a one time deal.  
While examining the estimated economic benefits below, it is important to keep in mind 
that the reported effects are underestimated for many reasons: First, I have treated the Head Start 
children in the same footing as the children without preschool. Second, the preschool programs 
that the respondents went into were the ones that existed during the sixties.  The quality of 
preschool programs ever since has improved significantly and thus the effects of current 
preschool programs will be much higher than the estimates that we have.   
  Note that since ε  does not affect earnings, the optimal 
* h  depends only on the 
observable component of the parent’s state variables. In the absence of a social contract, suppose 
the parents follow the optimum preschool investment plan 
* h  as shown in table 4. The invariant 
distribution of the corresponding transition matrix  * h Q  is also shown in table 4 under the heading 
*(without) p .  The interpretation of this invariant distribution is as follows:  If 
*(without) p  is 
the distribution of population over the observable states of generation t, and the parents of 
generation t follow the optimal preschool investment plan 
* h , then the distribution of  population 
of the next generation will also be 
*(without) p . 
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4.1 Social  Mobility 
Given any transition matrix  * h Q  over the observable states, there exists a number of 
mobility measures in the literature.  Sommers and Conlisk [1979] argue that out of the existing 
measures,   max 1 λ −  is the most appropriate measure of social mobility, where  max λ  is the second 
highest positive eigenvalue of the transition probability matrix  * h Q  (the highest positive 
eigenvalue of a transition matrix is always 1).  I use this measure of social mobility to examine 
how the introduction of a social contract would improve social mobility.  The estimate of this 
measure of social mobility without a social contract is 0.6163.  After the introduction of a social 
contract, it improves to 0.6770.  The estimate of 0.6163 for the measure is very close to the 
estimates found in other studies of social mobility in the US.   
 
4.2 College  Mobility 
Denote by  ,, 1 , 2
s
ij Qq i j  ==   the intergenerational college mobility matrix in which state 1 
represents no college and state 2 represents college and higher. The element  ij q  represents the 
probability that a child of a parent of college education status j will move to college education 
status i. I report below the estimates of college mobility matrices, the corresponding invariant 
distributions, and the estimates of the mobility measure before and after the introduction of the 
social contract.   These estimates indicate that the introduction of the social contract will increase 
college enrollment from 0.24 to 0.28 for a child of non-college parent.  And the percentage of 
college enrolled population will increase in the long-run from the current low rate of 21% to a 
much higher rate of 41% with the introduction of the social contract, and to a rate of 38% without 
the social contract. That is, there will be a 3% increase in college enrollments in the long-run. 
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    [ ] 0.623 0.377
s p =   max 1 0.642
s λ −=  
 







    [ ] 0.588 0.412
s p =   max 1 0.680
s λ −=  
 
4.3 Income  Inequality 
Preschool experience will increase the income of the children of poor SES and thus it will 
reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. In the long-run, the income distribution that 
one observes is the invariant distribution. Taking the Gini-coefficient as our measure the income 
inequality, the estimated coefficients of income inequality are respectively 0.1809 without the 
social contract, and 0.1484 with the social contract. The estimated Gini-coefficient of 0.1809 
turns out to be very close to the estimates found in other studies on the US.  We note that the 
social contract of publicly providing preschool to children of poor SES leads to a significant 
reduction in income inequality.  
 
4.4  Tax Burden of the Social Contract 
Suppose the government provides preschool to the children of poor SES perpetually.  We 
know that the size of the population of poor SES will become smaller and smaller over time.  
Thus the resource needs of the program will become smaller, and the tax revenues will become 
higher over time.   One can look at the stream of these costs and benefits to the society and then 
compute the average per period costs and benefits to calculate the tax-burdens of the social   22
contract.  Applying the Ergodic theorem, however, this boils down to computing the costs and 
benefits of the invariant distribution that will result after the introduction of the social contract. 
Assuming a flat average income tax rate of 15% for all income groups, I computed that 
each dollar spent to provide free preschool to children of poor SES, the tax payers get back $1.16.  
This estimate is, however, based on using the cost data of a very high cost program whose 
benefits are much higher than the estimated benefits of this model, and also this benefit 
calculation does not take into account other public savings such as savings from welfare 
assistance and savings to the criminal justice system and potential victims of crimes. If these 
effects were incorporated, the returns would be much higher.  Using data from the High/Scope 
Perry Preschool Program Schweinhart et al. estimated a total benefit from all these sources to be 
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